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Effective approach/avoidance goal pursuit is critical for attaining long-term health and well-
being. Research on the neural correlates of key goal-pursuit processes (e.g., motivation)
has long been of interest, with lateralization in prefrontal cortex being a particularly fruitful
target of investigation. However, this literature has often been limited by a lack of spatial
specificity and has not delineated the precise aspects of approach/avoidance motivation
involved. Additionally, the relationships among brain regions (i.e., network connectivity) vital
to goal-pursuit remain largely unexplored. Specificity in location, process, and network rela-
tionship is vital for moving beyond gross characterizations of function and identifying the
precise cortical mechanisms involved in motivation.The present paper integrates research
using more spatially specific methodologies (e.g., functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing) with the rich psychological literature on approach/avoidance to propose an integrative
network model that takes advantage of the strengths of each of these literatures.
Keywords:goal pursuit, approachmotivation, avoidancemotivation, executive function,prefrontal cortex, laterality,
abstraction gradient
If you want to live a happy life, tie it to a goal, not to people or
things.
—Albert Einstein
APPROACH AND AVOIDANCE GOAL PURSUIT
The ability to pursue goals effectively is critical for attaining long-
term health and well-being. In fact, independently meeting even
our most basic needs requires some degree of successful goal
pursuit. Goal pursuit can be defined as “responses intention-
ally performed to bring about or maintain a desired state” or
“responses intentionally performed to control or prevent an unde-
sired state,” often termed approach and avoidance goal pursuit,
respectively (Moskowitz and Grant, 2009). Research suggests that
this approach/avoidance dichotomy is a central characteristic of
goal pursuit and corresponds to two fundamental motivational
systems (Elliot, 2006).
An extant body of neuroscience research provides a valuable
foundation for understanding approach/avoidance functions. In
particular, findings suggest that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is lat-
eralized with respect to motivational direction, with left PFC asso-
ciated with approach and right PFC with avoidance (for review, see
Spielberg et al., 2008). However, a number of factors limit the util-
ity of this work (Miller et al., 2013). For example, research inves-
tigating approach/avoidance lateralization in PFC often fails to
elucidate the specific aspects of approach/avoidance thought to be
associated with prefrontal asymmetry (Tomarken and Zald, 2009).
More broadly, neuroscience research on approach/avoidance goal
pursuit and motivation has largely failed to take advantage of the
rich psychological literature in this area, limiting the extent to
which neural mechanisms involved in more complex goal-pursuit
processes can be represented. Therefore, integration of the litera-
ture on goal pursuit in (lateralized) PFC with nuanced conceptual-
izations of approach/avoidance that deconstruct these fairly broad
constructs into component processes will be necessary to achieve
a full understanding of the neural mechanisms of goal pursuit.
Historically, an additional limiting factor in investigations of
approach/avoidance lateralization in PFC has been a reliance on
low-density electroencephalography (EEG), which does not allow
for very precise spatial localization of activity (Tomarken and Zald,
2009). In the last two decades, functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) has come to the fore as the dominant method to
attain spatial specificity (although lateralization is often ignored
or assessed inadequately; Herrington et al., 2005). However, the
quest for spatial specificity has had an unfortunate consequence.
Specifically, the vast majority of fMRI research has relied on what
has been termed the “modular paradigm,” in which processes are
mapped simplistically onto specific brain regions, and connectiv-
ity among regions is not taken into consideration (Miller, 2010;
Meehan and Bressler, 2012). Given that regions of the brain are
nodes in highly interconnected networks rather than indepen-
dent “islands” (Sporns, 2011), and changes in connectivity have a
distributed impact throughout a network (Levit-Binnun and Gol-
land, 2011), attempts to represent the neural mechanisms of goal
pursuit and motivation will necessarily be limited until connectiv-
ity between network nodes is taken into account. Fortuitously,
a recent explosion of methods for network identification and
description (Bressler and Menon, 2010) has given us the tools
to dramatically increase the complexity of the processes that we
are able to represent, moving us closer to accurate representations
of our constructs of interest (Chen and Berrios, 1998).
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The present paper attempts to fill these gaps in the liter-
ature by presenting a network model of the neural instantia-
tion of approach/avoidance goal pursuit. It reviews and inte-
grates nuanced psychological models of approach/avoidance into
a framework for understanding the extant neuroscience research,
presents a preliminary structure of network connections, and out-
lines the way in which network nodes may interact to pursue
goals. Importantly, this model incorporates hemispheric lateral-
ity, often ignored in fMRI research. Given the focus on cortical
lateralization, the scope of the present paper is limited largely
to PFC.
KEY GOAL-PURSUIT PROCESSES
As mentioned above, what have been termed the approach and
avoidance motivational systems form the basis for the two types
of goal pursuit. Although many definitions of motivation have
been proposed, several functional aspects are fairly consistent.
Specifically, many theories conceptualize motivation as internal
processes that select goals based on their predicted value (e.g.,
reward or punishment), initiate behavior to achieve goals, and
maintain goal-directed action (e.g., Jones, 1955; Lindsley, 1957;
Campbell and Pritchard, 1976). Thus, motivation is necessary for
an organism to pursue goals.
However, the construct of motivation does not encompass all
processes needed to pursue goals. Many theorists have proposed
that cognition interacts with motivational processes during goal
pursuit (e.g., Sorrentino and Higgins, 1986; Locke and Latham,
2002). Although usually not explicitly defined, cognition has often
been conceptualized as “those processes that mediate the acqui-
sition and representation of knowledge about the world” (Kuhl,
1986, p. 407), including skills and abilities (Locke, 2000). This
work rests on the assumption that motivation and cognition are
separable processes (Kruglanski, 1999). However, there does not
appear to be sufficient grounds to assume this dichotomy, with
many theorists asserting that motivation and cognition are, at
the very least, highly overlapping and interdependent (Lazarus,
1991; Miller, 1996, 2010; Sherman and Sherman, 1999; Crocker
et al., 2013), if not simply different facets of the same construct
(Sorrentino and Higgins, 1986; Kruglanski, 1999).
Distinguishing between motivational and cognitive processes
becomes even more difficult when considering executive func-
tion. Similar to cognition, the construct of executive function is
often defined imprecisely and with a large amount of variability
(Martin and Failows, 2010). At a broad level, executive function
is often conceptualized as the processes by which goal-directed
action is carried out (Banich, 2009). Therefore, executive func-
tion shares with motivation a fundamental focus on goal pursuit.
However, these constructs appear to have separable aspects. For
example, processes involved in the energization of behavior are
often considered to be solely the province of motivation. Addi-
tionally, executive function is associated with abilities, such as
shifting, updating, and inhibition (Miyake et al., 2000), that are
not usually considered to be part of the construct of motivation.
The present paper provides a model of how the psychological
processes involved in the pursuit of goals are instantiated in the
brain, rather than delineating those processes which belong to
motivation vs. executive function (or cognition more generally).
Given that the present paper builds on psychological models of
motivation, a motivational framework will be privileged. How-
ever, some of the processes discussed in the present paper under
the rubric of motivation could just as validly be conceptualized as
cognitive or executive function.
HIERARCHICAL APPROACH AND AVOIDANCE
MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEMS
Approach and avoidance motivation are hypothesized to form
the “basic building blocks that underlie the complexity of human
behavior”(Carver et al., 2000, p. 741). Several researchers have sug-
gested that these motivational systems are comprised of a number
of hierarchical levels, with lower levels of these models subservient
to higher levels (Lang et al., 1998; Elliot, 2006; Scholer and Hig-
gins, 2008). For instance, Higgins and colleagues (for a review, see
Scholer and Higgins, 2008) proposed a structure with three levels:
the system, strategic, and tactical levels. These levels are thought
to be hierarchical, but the selection of approach and avoidance is
independent at each level.
SYSTEM LEVEL
At the system level, approach and avoidance are defined in rela-
tion to the goal that is currently held. Specifically, the goal can
be to approach a potential desirable outcome or avoid a potential
undesirable outcome. The critical determinant at this level is how
the individual views the goal-object (the outcome of focus), rather
than the properties of the goal-object itself. Therefore, the same
goal-object can be part of either an approach or avoidance goal,
depending on the individual’s motivational orientation. Given two
individuals striving to get an A on a test, one individual could
view an A as an accomplishment that will bring them pleasure (a
desirable outcome), whereas the other could view getting anything
lower than an A as a failure that will bring them displeasure (an
undesirable outcome). Based on their motivational orientation,
the first individual wants to approach an A, whereas the second
individual wants to avoid getting anything lower than an A.
Given that numerous conceptualizations of the goal construct
are available in the literature, it is important to outline the spe-
cific operationalization used, in order to avoid confusion (Elliot
and Fryer, 2008). Elliot and Niesta (2009, p. 58) suggested that a
goal is defined as a “cognitive representation of a future object that
the organism is committed to approach or avoid.” In this concep-
tualization, the goal construct includes a commitment to pursue
the goal-object. This commitment, along with the representation
of the object (e.g., stimulus properties, associated value), must be
sustained over time. Thus, one function of the system level is to
maintain the goal construct over time.
STRATEGIC LEVEL
At the strategic level, approach and avoidance are defined in rela-
tion to the means or process of attaining a potential desirable
outcome or preventing a potential undesirable outcome. As shown
in Figure 1, at the strategic level one can approach matches to
a desirable outcome (i.e., outcomes consistent with the desired
state) or mismatches to an undesirable outcome (i.e., outcomes
inconsistent with the undesired state). Similarly, one can avoid
mismatches to a desirable outcome (i.e., outcomes inconsistent
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FIGURE 1 | Relationship between the system and strategic levels of the hierarchical model of motivation. Figure adapted from Higgins et al. (1994).
with the desired state) or matches to an undesirable outcome (i.e.,
outcomes consistent with the undesired state). Therefore, when
approaching a desirable outcome at the system level, one can either
approach matches to that outcome or avoid mismatches to that
outcome. For example, if the potential outcome was getting an
A, approaching a match could be studying hard, and avoiding
a mismatch could be staying away from situations that distract
from studying. Similarly, when avoiding an undesirable outcome
at the system level (e.g., not getting an A), one can either approach
mismatches (e.g., studying hard) or avoid matches (e.g., avoid-
ing distraction) to that outcome. Approach and avoidance at the
strategic level reflect general/broad plans or means, rather than the
specific instantiations of means, which are instead captured in the
tactical level.
As discussed above, individuals commit to approaching or
avoiding a certain end-state at the system level. In contrast, at the
strategic level, a commitment can be made to the goal-pursuit plan,
which Gollwitzer (1999) labeled an implementation intention (for
reviews, see Gollwitzer, 1999; Parks-Stamm and Gollwitzer, 2009).
Gollwitzer conceptualized implementation intentions as if-then
plans that link goal-directed actions to anticipated opportunities
to engage in these actions (i.e., committing to act in a certain way
when a specific situation is encountered). For example, if a stu-
dent commits to the goal of approaching an A, that student may
form an approach plan to complete extra credit assignments (the
action) whenever they are offered by the instructor (the situation).
Research indicates that forming implementation intentions
increases the likelihood of goal attainment, especially for difficult-
to-obtain goals (see Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006, for a meta-
analysis of 94 studies indicating an effect size of d = 0.65). Goll-
witzer (1999) attempted to explain this effect by suggesting that
implementation intentions make the anticipated situation and
planned response more cognitively accessible (i.e., primed). For
instance, increasing the accessibility of the anticipated situation
makes it easier to detect in the presence of distraction. Similarly,
increasing the accessibility of the planned response makes it easier
to select in the presence of competing responses. Research supports
this hypothesis (for a review, see Gollwitzer et al., 2004), includ-
ing in populations that experience executive dysfunction (e.g.,
children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Gawrilow
and Gollwitzer, 2008).
When implementation intentions are not formed, individu-
als must actively attend to the environment in order to detect
opportunities to pursue the goal, which is more effortful and
lacks the benefits discussed above (Gollwitzer, 1999). However,
in some circumstances the formation of implementation inten-
tions can be detrimental, and active monitoring may be the
more successful choice. For example, implementation intentions
can interfere with the pursuit of concurrent goals (Achtziger
et al., 2012) unless the situation and action committed to in
the implementation intention subserve both goals. Addition-
ally, implementation intentions can be detrimental when novel
goal-pursuit situations are encountered, because the height-
ened accessibility of the option committed to can direct atten-
tion away from novel situations (Parks-Stamm et al., 2007). In
summary, at the strategic level, approach and avoidance goal-
pursuit plans are selected and can either be committed to
(i.e., the formation of implementation intentions) or actively
managed.
TACTICAL LEVEL
At the tactical level, approach and avoidance are defined in rela-
tion to the specific ways a strategy could be implemented in a
particular context. For example, if the strategy were to study hard,
an approach tactic could be setting aside a specific time to study.
An avoidance tactic could be making sure that no important study
materials are missing. The tactical level is still at a higher level than
the actual behavior implemented in a given situation, because an
avoidance tactic can be implemented through physically approach-
ing a stimulus and vice versa. For example, an avoidance tactic,
such as ensuring that no important study materials are missing,
could be implemented with approach behavior, such as approach-
ing a classmate to ask them to show you their study materials
or approaching the professor to ask them whether your study
materials are adequate.
Although the levels are considered to be independent, Scholer
and Higgins (2008) hypothesized that individuals tend to be con-
sistent across levels. Higgins (2000, 2005) accounted for this con-
sistency by proposing that inconsistency across levels leads to dis-
ruption in motivational orientation (i.e., approach or avoidance),
which, in turn, leads to decreases in goal engagement (i.e., the
amount of attention and effort invested in the goal). When there
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is consistency across levels, motivational orientation is maintained,
and goal engagement is sustained.
TEMPERAMENT LEVEL
Elliot (2006) proposed a complementary hierarchical model
of approach/avoidance motivation. This model consists of a
temperament level comprised of individual differences in sensi-
tivity to desired (approach temperament) or undesired (avoidance
temperament) potential outcomes and adoption of approach or
avoidance goals accordingly (at the system level). For example, a
student high on avoidance temperament faced with an upcoming
test will be sensitive to the potential for failure (e.g., appearing
unintelligent) and is likely to adopt the goal of getting an A on
the test in order to avoid failure. In contrast, a student high on
approach temperament will be sensitive to the potential for suc-
cess (e.g., appearing intelligent) and is likely to adopt the goal of
getting an A in order to approach success. These students share the
same goal-object (i.e., getting an A), but the underlying reasons
for that goal differ.
Along with sensitivity to particular outcomes, the tempera-
ment level also involves general tendencies to adopt approach and
avoidance means to attain goals (likely at both the strategic and
tactical levels). Thus, the temperament level should lead to a ten-
dency to engage the approach and/or avoidance systems overall,
providing another method by which consistency across levels is
attained.
INTEGRATED MODEL
In summary, combining Scholer and Higgins’ (2008) and Elliot’s
(2006) models, the present proposal offers a hierarchical model
of approach/avoidance motivation that consists of four levels:
temperamental, system, strategic, and tactical. The temperamen-
tal level consists of broad tendencies to implement approach or
avoidance goals and approach or avoidance means to attain these
goals. The system level maintains the goals that are held, approach-
ing desired outcomes and/or avoiding undesired outcomes. The
strategic level represents the general means or process by which
the goal will be pursued, and, at the tactical level, the strategy is
instantiated in a specific context.
We propose that these levels can be conceptualized along a gra-
dient of both abstraction and timescale, with higher levels being
more abstract and typically having a longer timescale. For exam-
ple, we posit that the system level has a longer time scale than
the strategic level, because the goal must be maintained over time,
during which a number of strategies can be employed. Thus, a goal
must be maintained at the system level over longer periods than
any particular strategy.
Similarly, we propose that the strategic level is more abstract
than the tactical level, because the tactical level represents the
implementation of the strategy in a given context. The system
level is more abstract than the strategic level, because the same
goal can be subserved by several strategies (i.e., equifinality, Mar-
tin and Tesser, 2009). Furthermore, goals themselves can range
from concrete (e.g., get an A on a specific test) to abstract (e.g., be
a nice person), whereas strategies are tied to specific goals. Thus,
strategies can only be as abstract as the goals they are tied to. For
example, it could be argued that a strategy such as “study hard”
is more abstract than the goal of getting an A on a test. However,
in this case, the strategy would be to study specific material (the
material that will be tested) to the degree needed to attain an A in
this particular class (which incorporates all the concrete informa-
tion known about the class). If the strategy were simply to “study
hard,” it would not be a strategy for this particular goal, but likely
the larger goal of doing well at one’s studies overall. Thus, we
suggest that, for a strategy to be tied to a particular goal, it must
incorporate the parameters specific to that goal. This constrains
the level of abstraction of a particular strategy, with the upper limit
being the level of abstraction of the goal. Finally, the temperament
level is the most abstract and has the longest time scale, as it reflects
dispositions over the lifetime to activate a motivational orientation
that is independent of specific goals.
The integrated hierarchical model proposed here implies that
higher levels in the structure exert control over lower levels. For
example, to attain a goal held at the system level, the goal must
be maintained over time and appropriate strategies employed at
appropriate times. Thus, processing at the strategic level is con-
strained by the particular goal held at the system level, and the
system level must engage the strategic level when needed. Con-
sequently, the role of the system level can be conceptualized as
biasing processing in lower levels of the structure in support of
an overarching goal. Given that multiple goals can be held at one
time, the system level must also prioritize goals at any moment
and bias processing accordingly. Therefore, one important func-
tion of this motivational system is to constrain processing at lower
levels such that the organism continues to move toward the goal,
accomplished through top-down biasing by levels higher in the
hierarchy.
Although the proposed model is hierarchical, this is not to imply
that communication between levels is always one-way (in fact, such
a view is at odds with prefrontal neuroanatomy, e.g., Averbeck and
Seo, 2008, as discussed below). Rather, bidirectional information
flow between levels is vital to providing the feedback necessary to
adaptively pursue goals (Fuster, 2008). In addition, the proposed
hierarchy does not imply that inter-level communication must
occur only through adjacent levels (e.g., the system level must bias
the tactical level only through the strategic level). It appears likely
that inter-level communication will occur in accordance with the
hierarchy more often than not, because processing in adjacent lev-
els will be more relevant that processing in non-adjacent levels. For
example, information regarding the success of a particular tactic
will have more utility for evaluating the larger strategy than for
evaluating the larger goal (at the system level). However, infor-
mation flow between non-adjacent levels is crucial in many cases.
For example, given the complexity of our environment, the sys-
tem level often maintains multiple goals simultaneously. In order
to determine which particular goal to emphasize at any given
moment, the tactical level must provide feedback to the system
level about the estimated success of the tactics currently associ-
ated with each goal. Thus, the hierarchical nature of the proposed
model still allows for the flexibility necessary to adaptively pursue
goals.
The type of flexible communication described above is neces-
sary in order to adaptively identify subgoals. That is, it is essen-
tial to set smaller, more proximal goals that comprise the steps
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necessary to attaining larger, distal goals (Kruglanski et al., 2002).
For example, in order to obtain an academic degree, a student
must complete a series of classes. Thus, completing each class is
a subgoal necessary to the larger goal. An obvious question is do
subgoals differ from lower levels in the hierarchy? We propose that
these concepts, although similar, are relevant to different pieces of
the process of pursuing longer-term goals. For example, a particu-
lar strategy is only relevant to the degree that it subserves the larger
goal, whereas subgoals are themselves goals. That is, subgoals are
committed to in and of themselves, which can become problem-
atic when the subgoal becomes more important that the higher
order goal it was meant to serve (D’Zurilla and Nezu, 2007). With
relation to the proposed model, subgoals would be maintained
by the system level once they were identified and committed to
as goals. Thus, what may start out as a strategy/tactic becomes a
subgoal once the individual identifies it as a discrete goal, apart
from just a means to an end.
In conclusion, the integrated hierarchical model of
approach/avoidance goal-pursuit proposed here is a nuanced con-
ceptualization that deconstructs the fairly broad constructs of
approach/avoidance into important component processes. We
propose that this psychological model can serve as a framework for
understanding the processes examined in neuroscience research
on goal-pursuit systems.
NEURAL INSTANTIATION OF APPROACH/AVOIDANCE GOAL
PURSUIT
Building on the proposed psychological model of approach and
avoidance, we next attempt to integrate disparate bodies of neu-
roscience research to construct a preliminary model of the neural
mechanisms instantiating the psychological model. In the present
paper, we focus on PFC, given an overwhelming research base
indicating that PFC is central to the pursuit of goals (Miller and
Cohen, 2001; Fuster, 2008). Given that the approach/avoidance
distinction is fundamental to the proposed model, we begin by
reviewing research that has found such a distinction in prefrontal
organization.
LATERALIZATION IN PREFRONTAL CORTEX ASSOCIATED WITH
MOTIVATION
A long line of research suggests that PFC is lateralized with respect
to motivational/emotional valence, with right PFC associated with
avoidance motivation and unpleasant emotion, and left PFC asso-
ciated with approach motivation and pleasant emotion (for review,
see Heller et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2013). PFC lateralization
with respect to motivational or emotional valence is supported
by research using a number of different methodologies, including
neuropsychological testing (e.g., Flor-Henry, 1976), brain lesion
patients (e.g., Gainotti, 1972), and EEG (e.g., Davidson et al.,
1990). Although PFC asymmetries have regularly been observed
in EEG and other methodologies, they have been elusive in studies
employing fMRI. This method complements EEG in that it pro-
vides better spatial resolution than traditional low-density EEG for
locating specific areas of PFC involved in emotion and motivation.
Herrington et al. (2005) were the first to demonstrate leftward lat-
eralization for pleasant emotion using fMRI, which was localized
to DLPFC. As discussed in Herrington et al. (2010), one reason
why lateralization findings are uncommon in fMRI may be that
lateralization is rarely tested directly. Indeed, region (including
hemisphere) is almost never a factor or predictor in analyses of
fMRI data. Statements are often made about what are in effect
multiple simple-effects tests without a systematic evaluation of
the underlying interaction.
MOTIVATION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
Although motivation and executive function are both vital to goal-
pursuit individually, we and others have argued that it is the
interaction between these sets of processes that drives effective
goal pursuit (e.g., Pessoa, 2009; Spielberg et al., 2011). Consider
this scenario involving a student in her first year of college: it is
the night before her first big test, and she planned to study for
several hours and get a full night’s rest. However, her roommate,
with whom she has yet to develop a relationship, has just invited
her to a party taking place that evening. If the student is moti-
vated more strongly to obtain an A on her test, she must inhibit
distraction (i.e., engage executive function) caused by reminders
of the party (e.g., seeing her roommate’s jacket) in order to fully
concentrate on her material. However, if the student is motivated
more strongly to build a friendship, she must inhibit distraction
caused by reminders of her impending test (e.g., seeing a stu-
dent from class at the party) in order to enjoy the party and fully
interact with her roommate. In other words, what information
is inhibited depends on which goal the student is motivated to
pursue.
An emerging body of research consistently implicates areas
of PFC in the integration of motivation and executive function
processes (Gilbert and Fiez, 2004; Gray et al., 2005; Krawczyk
et al., 2007; Locke and Braver, 2008; Rowe et al., 2008; Szatkowska
et al., 2008). Such integration is consistent with conceptualizations
of PFC as being necessary “to orchestrate thought and action in
accordance with internal goals” (Miller and Cohen, 2001). For
example, Pochon et al. (2002) examined the relation between
reward processing, a facet of motivation, and performance on
a working memory task. Results revealed that left DLPFC was
activated by both working memory demands and increasing lev-
els of reward. Taylor et al. (2004) conducted a similar study that
examined the interaction between state motivation and working
memory by manipulating motivation in terms of both reward and
punishment. Consistent with the findings of Pochon et al. (2002),
motivational processes interacted with working memory load in
bilateral DLPFC. Several studies have also examined the inter-
action between motivation and inhibition-related processes. For
example, Padmala and Pessoa (2010, 2011) found that monetary
reward interacted with inhibition requirements in DLPFC (bilat-
eral in one study, right only in the other study). In addition, Krebs
et al. (2011) found that right DLPFC was activated when inhibiting
goal-irrelevant reward associations.
Thus, several studies suggest that DLPFC is essential for the
neural integration of motivation and executive function processes.
These studies can be interpreted as manipulating the system level
of the present hierarchical model of motivation, because they
manipulate the reasons for the goal (i.e., to do well in order to
obtain a reward or avoid a punishment). Thus, this research sug-
gests that the system level is instantiated in (at least) DLPFC, which
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is consistent with research suggesting that DLPFC is involved in
representing and maintaining goals (e.g., MacDonald et al., 2000).
Although involvement of DLPFC was observed in all studies, there
is inconsistency in the hemisphere which exhibited activation.
Inconsistencies in the lateralization of DLPFC activation may
be due several issues, including differences in the motivational
manipulation used across the studies and the facet of executive
function recruited. For example, Pochon et al. (2002) employed
only a reward manipulation, consistent with the leftward lateral-
ization found, whereas Taylor et al.’s (2004) motivational manipu-
lation included both reward and punishment, consistent with the
bilateral activation observed. However, all the studies recruiting
inhibition used only reward and found right DLPFC activation
(one study found bilateral activation), suggesting that task dif-
ferences may play some part. The picture is further clouded by
the fact that none of these studies actually tested laterality effects.
Thus, the extent of the inconsistency is not clear.
MOTIVATIONAL TEMPERAMENT AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
Extending the work on state motivation and executive function,
recent research has examined the interaction of motivational
temperament with executive function. For example, Spielberg
et al. (2011) investigated moderation of neural activation asso-
ciated with the color-word Stroop (1935) task by approach and
avoidance temperament. Neural activation associated with incon-
gruent words was contrasted with activation associated with con-
gruent words, and approach and avoidance temperament scores,
computed using a confirmatory factor analysis of several self-
report scales, were entered as between-subject predictors. Hemi-
spheric lateralization was tested directly using methods similar to
those of Herrington et al. (2010).
Consistent with research on state motivation and regional
brain activity, approach temperament moderated activation in
two regions of left DLPFC (a relatively anterior region in BA 8
and 9 and a more posterior area in BA 9 only), and avoidance
temperament moderated activation in one region of right DLPFC
(BA 9 and 6), all of which were lateralized effects. More specifi-
cally, higher levels of motivational temperament were associated
with greater activation in the condition requiring stronger inhi-
bition (incongruent, relative to congruent). Furthermore, higher
levels of temperament were associated with better performance
on the task, supporting the important moderating effect of such
motivational tendencies on executive function.
The areas of DLPFC observed in Spielberg et al. (2011) have
been associated with a number of other functions, including
behavioral inhibition, planning action, attending to cues predict-
ing the occurrence of a motivationally salient event, and respond-
ing when motivationally salient events occur (Volle et al., 2005;
Abler et al., 2006; Bickel et al., 2009; Kaladjian et al., 2009). Incor-
porating this research with their findings, and consistent with
Herrington et al. (2010), Spielberg et al. (2011) hypothesized that
these regions of DLPFC are involved in implementing a motiva-
tional set that biases lower-order processing (i.e., attention to ink
color vs. word meaning) to be congruent with goals. These find-
ings have recently been replicated using an emotion-word Stroop
task (Spielberg et al., 2012a), supporting the generalizability of
these conclusions.
Although trait (e.g., motivational temperament) and state
motivational manipulations are useful individually, it is likely
that a deep understanding of the neural mechanisms involved
in integrating motivation and executive function will occur only
through a combination of these methods (e.g., investigating how
trait phenomena moderate state manipulations). This is because a
specific outcome can be viewed as an approach and/or avoidance
goal depending on the motivational tendencies of each individ-
ual. For example, the potential to win a monetary reward will
likely be viewed as an approach goal by many individuals, but
may also be viewed as an avoidance goal (e.g., an opportunity to
perform poorly and miss out on winning). Taking motivational
temperament into account will allow for a greater level of cer-
tainty regarding the manner in which particular outcomes will be
viewed.
INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE
Neuroscience research in the field of intertemporal choice, which
investigates choices between outcomes that differ in temporal delay
and reward/punishment magnitude, provides another avenue to
examine the instantiation of motivational systems in the brain.
Humans are often faced with choices between options that differ
in the timescale of the potential outcomes. Often, one option is
associated with a shorter delay and a smaller reward, whereas the
delay in the other option is longer but the reward value greater.
For example, an individual may have the goal of losing weight
and be faced with the choice of whether to eat a high-calorie
desert. In order to maximize gain/minimize loss over time, goals
(e.g., losing weight) must be maintained in the face of com-
peting options (e.g., sensory pleasure now), which is a process
that can be associated with the system level of the hierarchical
model of approach/avoidance. Although the choice with the longer
delay has an objectively better outcome, this option is often not
chosen, because humans discount the value of delayed rewards
(Ainslie, 2001). The rate of future discounting can be thought of
as a measure of impulsiveness, because it reflects the tendency
to forego larger, long-term rewards in order to gain more imme-
diate satisfaction (Ainslie, 1975). This proposal is supported by
research indicating that more impulsive individuals (e.g., children
with ADHD) discount future rewards more than less impulsive
individuals (Barkley et al., 2001).
Recent research has attempted to identify brain regions involved
in integrating temporal delay into the decision-making process.
Several studies suggest that DLPFC, medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC), and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) are involved in
decisions to forego proximal reward or incur proximal punish-
ment in order to maximize benefit over time, providing further
support for the hypothesis that the system level is instantiated
(in part) in DLPFC. Specifically, several studies have found that
greater activation in DLPFC, MPFC, and PCC predicted the choice
of the larger, later outcome (McClure et al., 2007; Wittmann et al.,
2007; Weber and Huettel, 2008; Ballard and Knutson, 2009). As
well, activation in DLPFC, MPFC, and PCC has been found to
be positively correlated with the length of the delay associated
with outcomes (Luhmann et al., 2008; Ballard and Knutson, 2009).
Finally, gray-matter volume in DLPFC has been found to be pos-
itively associated with the tendency to choose the larger, later
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outcome over the smaller, more immediate outcome (Bjork et al.,
2009).
In these studies, the delay and magnitude associated with each
option were explicitly presented to participants. Therefore, max-
imizing reward over time required only the ability to resist the
earlier option. In many real-world choices, however, the magni-
tude and delay of the outcome will not be explicit. For example,
when choosing whether to forego eating (immediately available)
cake in order to lose weight, the impact of cake eating on weight
and how long it will be until the desired amount of weight will be
lost (if cake is not eaten) will usually be unclear. In these situa-
tions, learning history can play an important role in determining
which choice will be selected (e.g., how quickly a specific indi-
vidual has lost weight in the past). Several studies have examined
intertemporal choice when participants must learn the contin-
gencies associated with different options. For example, Tanaka
et al. (2004) employed a decision-making task in which partic-
ipants had to learn to incur small, immediate losses in order
to gain large, delayed rewards. Results revealed that learning to
obtain larger, later rewards was associated with increased activa-
tion in left DLPFC, MPFC, and PCC, which is consistent with
research linking these brain regions to foregoing proximal reward
or incurring proximal punishment in order to maximize reward
over time.
Yarkoni et al. (2005) employed a task similar to that of Tanaka
et al. (2004). However, in their task, the strategy of foregoing
more immediate rewards to obtain the delayed reward did not
always maximize the total reward over time. Instead, it was opti-
mal to choose the immediate reward in one of the conditions.
Results revealed that DLPFC activation was associated with opti-
mum performance (i.e., maximizing total reward) on the task.
Specifically, when reward was maximized by sacrificing smaller,
earlier rewards to obtain larger, later rewards, sustained activa-
tion in DLPFC across the entirety of the trials was greater than
activation during the time at which participants actually made
choices. When reward was maximized by choosing smaller, ear-
lier rewards, DLPFC exhibited greater activation during the actual
choice period, relative to the sustained activation across trials.
This indicates that the involvement of DLPFC is not restricted to
obtaining delayed rewards. Rather, DLPFC appears to be involved
in maximizing overall benefit.
Taken together, this research supports the hypothesis that
DLPFC is involved in maximizing benefit/minimizing harm over
time. This would involve both the maintenance of appropriate
goals in the face of competition (e.g., foregoing a small prox-
imal reward for a larger, delayed reward) and the selection of
appropriate strategies (e.g., determining whether obtaining prox-
imal rewards or foregoing proximal rewards for larger, delayed
rewards will maximize total benefit over time). Therefore, this
research provides evidence that DLPFC is involved in instantiat-
ing both the system and strategic levels of the hierarchical model
of motivation.
Both MPFC and PCC also appear to play significant roles
in maximizing total reward over time. For example, research by
Maddock (1999) indicates that PCC is involved in integrating
emotional and motivational information with memory during
recall. This suggests a role for MPFC and PCC in the anticipation
of delayed rewards. When choosing between potential rewards, a
representation of each outcome, incorporating motivationally rel-
evant information based on past experience, is needed in order to
evaluate the predicted subjective value of the outcome. In addition,
the anticipation period itself can have value (Berns et al., 2007),
because anticipation can be pleasant or unpleasant (or neutral).
Greater incorporation of motivationally relevant information into
mental simulations of a potential outcome will make an option
seem more or less attractive.
The involvement of MPFC and PCC in the anticipation of
potential outcomes is supported by several studies, including a
study that found increased MPFC and PCC activation when par-
ticipants self-reflected on both approach- and avoidance-related
goals (Johnson et al., 2006). Additionally, dissociation in PCC acti-
vation to motivationally relevant stimuli has been found in relation
to approach and avoidance (Touryan et al., 2007). Specifically,
when an approach orientation was induced, greater activation
in PCC was observed during the evaluation of pleasant stimuli
(relative to unpleasant stimuli). In contrast, when an avoidance
orientation was induced, greater activation in PCC was observed
during the evaluation of unpleasant stimuli (relative to pleasant
stimuli). Finally, Peters and Buchel (2010) directly investigated
the impact of imagery associated with potential future outcomes
on temporal discounting. Participants performed a classic delay
discounting task in which they chose between immediate and
delayed rewards. Before performing the task, participants identi-
fied a number of planned future events (e.g., going to a workshop,
going to a friend’s wedding). In one condition, the delayed reward
choice was linked to one of the identified future events (i.e.,
the reward would be given on the day that the event occurred).
Results revealed that rewards were discounted less heavily in this
condition, relative to a control condition in which no links to
future events were presented. Additionally, vividness ratings of
future events correlated negatively with the rate of discounting,
such that greater vividness was associated with less discounting.
Importantly, both MPFC and PCC exhibited greater activation
when links were presented, relative to the control condition, sug-
gesting that these regions are involved in the representation of
goals via imagery or other means. As well, the subjective value
of the delayed reward option (i.e., the objective value multiplied
by the delay discount rate) was correlated with brain activation
in MPFC and PCC during the condition in which links to future
events were presented, suggesting that these regions are involved
in representing the value of future outcomes through associated
imagery.
These findings are consistent with a model of the neural instan-
tiation of prospection (Buckner and Carroll, 2007). Prospection is
the process by which past memories are used to envision potential
future scenarios, and this process can be used to assist in plan-
ning for future goals. Buckner and Carroll (2007) suggested that
MPFC and PCC, along with other areas, are vital to the process of
prospection.
In summary, the present review of the literature on intertem-
poral choice supports the hypothesis that DLPFC plays an essen-
tial role in goal pursuit and additionally implicates MPFC and
PCC as being important components due to their involvement
in the representation of motivationally salient aspects of potential
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future outcomes. In combination with the research reviewed above
on the interaction of motivation and executive function, this
research provides a starting point for a model of motivation in
the brain.
A MODEL OF APPROACH/AVOIDANCE GOAL-PURSUIT
PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN
Converging lines of research suggest that DLPFC implements a
motivational set that biases lower-order neural processes to facili-
tate the achievement of goals. It is proposed here that this research
can be interpreted by applying the framework of the hierarchi-
cal model of motivation (Elliot, 2006; Scholer and Higgins, 2008)
to a set of proposals (for reviews, see Botvinick, 2008; Badre and
D’Esposito, 2009) that superior, lateral prefrontal cortex (SLPFC),
including DLPFC, is organized along a dimension of abstraction.
Generally, more anterior regions (e.g., BA 10, DLPFC) are involved
in the most abstract aspects of goal-directed processing (e.g.,
maintaining the ultimate goal), and more posterior regions (e.g.,
pre-motor cortex) are involved in processing the least abstract
aspects (e.g., planning motor sequences).
There is some disagreement regarding the nature of the abstrac-
tion that organizes SLPFC. One proposal is that the abstraction is
temporal in nature. Specifically, goals become more abstract as the
timescale of the task they direct increases (Badre and D’Esposito,
2009). According to Botvinick (2008), timescale is likely the key
parameter that governs the organization of SLPFC. Specifically,
more anterior regions guide behavior over a longer time-span than
do more posterior regions. Another proposal is policy abstraction,
in which more abstract goal representations are more general than
lower-level goal representations (Badre and D’Esposito, 2009).
It is proposed here that the gradient of abstraction and
timescale evident in the hierarchical model of motivation can be
mapped onto this SLPFC gradient, with the system level associ-
ated with more anterior SLPFC (e.g., BA 10, DLPFC) and lower
levels (i.e., strategic, tactical) moving sequentially more posterior
(e.g., BA 8, pre-motor cortex). The temperament level would be
associated with the activity/reactivity of these regions (especially
those instantiating the system level) rather than being associated
with a specific region of SLPFC. Additionally, it is proposed here
that SLPFC is lateralized with respect to motivational orientation,
with left SLPFC associated with approach and right SLPFC asso-
ciated with avoidance. This organization is illustrated in Figure 2.
As shown, approach at the system level can recruit both approach
and avoidance at the strategic level. However, approach at the sys-
tem level is more likely to recruit approach at the strategic level, as
indicated by the thicker arrows.
Support for this proposal can be found in a study by Kouneiher
et al. (2009), which examined the integration of motivation and
cognition in the context of a model of PFC abstraction proposed
by Koechlin and colleagues (Koechlin et al., 2003; Koechlin and
Summerfield, 2007). In this model, posterior DLPFC is hypothe-
sized to be involved in contextual control (i.e., control based on
rules related to the immediate context), whereas anterior DLPFC is
hypothesized to be involved in episodic control (i.e., control based
on a past event which indicates that a certain set of rules should
be applied in the current context). The most anterior region,
frontopolar PFC (e.g., BA 10), is hypothesized to be involved in
FIGURE 2 | Lateralized organization of superior, lateral prefrontal cortex
with regard to the hierarchical model of motivation. The thickness of
the arrows corresponds to the hypothesized strength of the relationship.
The larger brain is an axial view of the superior surface of the brain viewed
from above. The smaller brain is a sagittal view of the lateral surface of the
right hemisphere. The location and coverage of the ovals/circles is meant to
represent a relative placement rather than a delineation of specific cortex.
branching control (i.e., maintaining a task set in memory while
another task is carried out).
Kouneiher et al. (2009) found that rewards/punishments asso-
ciated with the context (the current trial) and the episode (the
current set of trials, which were preceded by a cue signaling
the possible incentives) moderated posterior and anterior DLPFC
activation, respectively. They also found an anterior-to-posterior
gradient in medial PFC, with dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
(dACC) activation moderated by episodic motivation and pre-
supplementary motor area activation moderated by contextual
motivation.
Support for the present proposal that the hierarchical model
of approach/avoidance motivation can be mapped onto an ante-
rior/posterior gradient of SLPFC can also be found in a recent
study investigating the effect of forming implementation inten-
tions on neural activation associated with goal pursuit (Gilbert
et al., 2009). The task contained two conditions, which differed
only in whether implementation intentions were externally pro-
vided to participants by experimenters. Given that the formation
of implementation intentions reduces the need for active engage-
ment of the strategic level (discussed above), and given that the
conditions were of equal difficulty and potential monetary reward
level, the conditions differed only on the extent to which the
strategic level was actively engaged during the task. Consistent
with the present proposal, engagement of the strategic level (i.e.,
when participants were not provided with implementations inten-
tions) was positively associated with activation in two areas of left
anterior SLPFC (BA 8 and 10). When participants were provided
with implementation intentions, the only area of SLFPC exhibiting
differential activation was left pre-motor cortex (BA 6).
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ORBITOFRONTAL CORTEX
In addition to SLPFC, several other areas are likely to be important
components of a model of motivation in the brain. As discussed
above, MPFC and PCC appear to play important roles in antici-
patory processes. Another potential region is orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC), which has been linked to the maintenance of the current
and expected motivational value of stimuli (O’Doherty and Dolan,
2006). This area likely provides information about stimulus value
to superior areas such as DLPFC (Szatkowska et al., 2008).
However, there is some question regarding the nature of the
value representations maintained in OFC (e.g., Roesch et al., 2007).
Recent work by Schoenbaum and colleagues (Schoenbaum and
Esber, 2010; Jones et al., 2012) suggests that OFC does not main-
tain cached value representations of a specific stimulus, per se.
Rather, OFC appears to be necessary for calculating value on the
fly in (at least somewhat) novel situations requiring integration
of value information from several sources. In other words, OFC is
required when an organism must infer the value of a stimulus –
not based on direct past experience of the particular situation
that is currently faced, but by integrating contingency and value
information from different sources to estimate value. This view is
supported by research indicating that Pavlovian or simple instru-
mental conditioning is not impacted by lesioning of OFC (this is
not the case for amygdala lesions; Schoenbaum and Esber, 2010).
Rather, OFC lesions prevent the suppression of old value when
the current context signals a change in value (but no impact is
observed after lesioning amygdala). Thus, OFC appears to be more
involved in the types of value representations needed specifically
in goal-directed behavior, as opposed to habit.
In addition, several studies suggest that the values maintained
in OFC are relative to the individual’s current state, rather than to
potential future states involved in longer-term goals (e.g., Schoen-
baum et al., 1998). For example, when an organism consumes a
desired food to satiation (i.e., the food is no longer appealing),
OFC tracks stimulus value relative to the current state of the indi-
vidual (e.g., high value at the start, low or negative value at the end),
rather than the long-term value of the food (which should remain
high, otherwise that food would not be consumed in the future;
Pickens et al., 2003). Additionally, several studies indicate that OFC
is associated with choosing smaller, earlier rewards in intertempo-
ral choice paradigms (e.g., Tanaka et al., 2004; Bjork et al., 2009).
Therefore, it may be that OFC is involved in value maintenance for
(usually shorter-term) goals related to the individual’s current state
(e.g., am I hungry now?). For (usually longer-term) goals related
to potential future states of the individual (e.g., will I be hun-
gry in the future?), MPFC and PCC may play a similar function
by integrating motivationally salient information into memory
that is recalled during anticipation. Alternatively, it is possible that
OFC is involved in estimating stimulus value based on any state,
whether that is the current state or an estimated future state. If so,
MPFC/PCC may be more involved in the creation of the potential
future state (e.g., estimating future needs/desires in a given cir-
cumstance). Future research separating estimation of value and
internal state will be valuable in teasing apart these competing
theories.
Research indicates that, like SLPFC, OFC may be organized
along a gradient of abstraction. Specifically, a recent meta-analysis
indicates that posterior OFC is closely associated with more
primary reinforcers (e.g., sweet taste), whereas anterior OFC
is closely associated with more abstract/secondary reinforcers
(e.g., money, pride; Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004). Addition-
ally, O’Doherty and Dolan (2006) have suggested that anterior,
medial OFC is associated with maintaining a common neural cur-
rency, allowing the values of different types of reinforcers to be
compared.
A medial vs. lateral distinction in OFC has been proposed by
O’Doherty (2007). Specifically, medial OFC is thought to rep-
resent the value of rewards, whereas lateral OFC is thought to
represent the value of punishments. However, there appears to be
some disagreement regarding the role of lateral OFC. Specifically,
Elliott et al. (2000) suggested that lateral OFC is activated when
previously rewarded behavior must be inhibited, rather than rep-
resenting the value of punishments per se. Kringelbach and Rolls
(2004) incorporated both views and suggested that lateral OFC
represents the value of punishments and signals that behavior
should change.
This organization of OFC conflicts with the proposal that left
PFC is associated with pleasant valence and approach motivation
and right PFC with unpleasant valence and avoidance motiva-
tion (Heller, 1993; Davidson and Irwin, 1999). Additionally, recent
meta-analysis suggests that OFC is lateralized with respect to emo-
tional valence, although not in the predicted direction (Wager
et al., 2008). Specifically, bilateral medial and right lateral OFC was
associated with pleasant emotional experience, whereas left middle
and lateral OFC was associated with unpleasant emotional experi-
ence. The association between bilateral, medial OFC and pleasant
valence is consistent with O’Doherty’s (2007) proposal. However,
the findings of this meta-analysis raise questions regarding the role
of lateral OFC that should be pursued in future research.
ANTERIOR CINGULATE CORTEX
Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is likely to be another important
component of a model of motivation. One theory of ACC function
is that ACC is involved in encoding the predicted value associated
with actions (for a review, see Rushworth and Behrens, 2008). This
includes the immediate reward or punishment value, as well as
the value of potential information about future events prompted
by the action. Additionally, ACC is hypothesized to influence the
degree to which information gained from current actions influ-
ences future decisions (Rushworth and Behrens, 2008). Informa-
tion represented in ACC is needed to efficiently create action plans
to pursue goals, suggesting that ACC provides this information to
SLPFC, including DLPFC. In relation to the hierarchical model of
motivation, information held in ACC will be particularly relevant
at the strategic and tactical levels.
An important consideration is to determine the regions of
ACC that provide this information, given that several parcella-
tions of ACC have been proposed. One influential parcellation
(Bush et al., 2000; Mohanty et al., 2007) divided ACC into two
sections; dorsal ACC was hypothesized to be more involved in
putatively cognitive tasks such as error processing, whereas rostral
ACC was hypothesized to be more involved in putatively emotional
tasks. However, mounting evidence has called this parcellation
into question. For example, Shackman et al. (2011) supported
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the association between dorsal ACC and putative cognitive con-
trol tasks but found that putatively emotional tasks were equally
likely to activate dorsal or rostral ACC. In addition, they found
that tasks involving pain were also more likely to activate dorsal
ACC. In order to resolve this apparent discrepancy, they proposed
that dorsal ACC is involved in using negative consequences (e.g.,
negative affect, pain) to adaptively modulate behavior, consistent
with the proposal by Rushworth and Behrens (2008).
This proposal is also supported by a study that employed both
diffusion tractography, which estimates the degree of white mat-
ter connectivity with other brain regions, and a meta-analysis of
fMRI studies to parcellate cingulate (Beckmann et al., 2009). This
analysis identified a region (roughly corresponding to the dor-
sal ACC region identified by Bush et al. (2000) but extending
around the genu of the corpus callosum into rostral ACC) that
is heavily connected to DLPFC and surrounding cortex and is
reliably activated by reward manipulations. Given that this ACC
region displays both motivation-related activation and connectiv-
ity to DLPFC, it is likely that this region provides motivational
information regarding actions to DLPFC.
THE PROPOSED MODEL
The model proposed here (illustrated in Figure 3) posits that the
system, strategic, and tactical levels of the hierarchical model of
approach/avoidance motivation are instantiated along an anterior-
to-posterior gradient of SLPFC (including DLFPC). Further, the
present review suggests that OFC and ACC provide information
about stimulus and action value, respectively, to these areas. Lastly,
MPFC and PCC are involved in integrating motivationally salient
information into the anticipation of potential future outcomes.
Thus, we propose that all regions discussed are involved in instan-
tiating the model, with SLPFC involved in overall coordination
and maintenance over time of level-specific processing.
As an example of how the model may work with a specific
goal, an individual may have the approach goal of losing weight
in order to be more healthy, which would be maintained in ante-
rior, left SLPFC (e.g., BA 10, anterior DLPFC). In order to pursue
this goal, an area of left SLPFC posterior to this (e.g., posterior
DLPFC) would be involved in the selection of an approach strategy
and would engage ACC in order to obtain information regard-
ing the potential value of different strategies. In this example,
two approach strategies could be exercising regularly and eating
healthy foods. The healthy eating strategy could be low value/high
cost if the individual frequently encounters high-calorie food and
has not been successful in the past in losing weight by eating
healthily. In contrast, the exercise strategy could be high value/low
cost if the individual has easy access to exercise equipment and
has been successful in losing weight with exercise in the past,
and this would likely be the strategy chosen. Anterior cingulate
would also be engaged by a more posterior region of left SLPFC
(e.g., pre-motor cortex) in order to determine the value of dif-
ferent approach tactics when judging which tactic to employ.
For example, if the strategy were to exercise, an approach tac-
tic could be going to the gym to participate in an exercise class
or calling a friend to jog with. If the individual is embarrassed
about showing their fitness level in front of strangers, the gym
class tactic could be low value/high cost, whereas the tactic of
FIGURE 3 | Motivational organization of superior, lateral prefrontal
cortex, and relationship with other brain areas in the model.
Green= superior, lateral prefrontal cortex. Blue= anterior cingulate cortex.
Red= orbitofrontal cortex. Purple=medial prefrontal cortex.
Orange=posterior cingulate cortex. Only left hemisphere is shown; right
hemisphere is similarly organized. The location and coverage of the areas is
meant to represent a relative placement rather than a delineation of specific
cortex.
jogging with a friend could be high value/low cost if the friend
is sympathetic because they are also out of shape and attempt-
ing to lose weight, and this would likely be the tactic chosen.
Finally, when faced with a conflicting goal, for example to enjoy
a high-calorie dessert, anterior SLPFC would engage MPFC and
PCC in anticipatory imagery of the future state of being thin.
OFC would be involved in calculating the value of the dessert
relative to the current state (though it may also be involved in
calculating future value based on the anticipated future state of
being thin).
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Although the brain areas currently integrated into the model
are proposed to be fundamental to the pursuit of goals, they are
almost certainly not the only brain areas involved. Other brain
regions are likely involved in instantiating fundamental compo-
nents of motivation and are not yet incorporated into the present
model. In addition, specific situations will necessitate the engage-
ment of brain areas that instantiate processes more specific to the
demands of that situation. For example, although engagement of
Broca’s area is not necessarily fundamental to goal-pursuit gener-
ally, it may be vital in situations where verbal rehearsal is needed
to complete the task.
RELATIONSHIP TO EXTANT MODELS
The proposed model overlaps in a number of important dimen-
sions with extant neural models of goal pursuit (although the
models discussed are not necessarily labeled as such). For exam-
ple, a number of models (e.g., Passingham and Wise, 2012) share
a hierarchical structure (see Pessoa, 2009, for an example of a less
hierarchical model), and this hierarchy is also mapped, at least
to some degree, along an anterior-posterior gradient in PFC in
some models (e.g., Fuster, 2008). In addition, the regions included
in the proposed model are largely common across models (e.g.,
ACC, OFC).
The present model extends these models in a number of
ways. First, the present model considers goal-pursuit related to
approach and avoidance motivation separately, a division sup-
ported by a long line of research, as discussed above. In addition,
the present model incorporates hemispheric asymmetry and the
differential mapping of approach and avoidance therein. Further-
more, although previous models share a hierarchical structure, the
present model incorporates well-researched psychological models
of approach and avoidance to flesh out the nature of this hierarchy.
PRELIMINARY TESTS OF THE MODEL
A recent study provided preliminary support for the proposed
network model (Spielberg et al., 2012b). In two independent
samples, this study found that OFC, ACC, MPFC, and PCC
interacted with regions of left and right DLPFC associated with
approach and avoidance, respectively, to maintain difficult goals.
Notably, approach and avoidance motivational temperament were
associated with greater connectivity between OFC and left and
right DLPFC, respectively, indicating that connections between
DLPFC and OFC are of particular importance for motivational
processes.
A recent explosion of methods for network identification and
description will allow for further testing and refinement of the pro-
posed model. Prominent among these methods is graph theory,
which can characterize the role of different brain regions (nodes)
within a network (see Bullmore and Sporns, 2009). For exam-
ple, graph theory can identify that nodes are more central to a
network (hubs) by examining the paths by which different nodes
communicate with each other. Hubs are those nodes which are
more often intermediaries through which different nodes com-
municate. Graph theory can also isolate specific circuits within the
larger network (modules) by identifying nodes that tend to com-
municate more with nodes within the module than those outside.
Importantly, graph theory can be used to test the importance of
a node in a network by removing the node and assessing whether
the network continues to function efficiently.
Use of graph theory has already begun to bear fruit. For exam-
ple, Kinnison et al. (2012) examined brain networks during a task
involving both motivational and executive function components.
Results revealed that reward increased the efficiency of connec-
tions, especially between cortical and subcortical regions. With
regard to the model proposed here, graph theory can be used to
test a number of important components. For example, regions of
superior-lateral PFC (e.g., DLPFC) are posited to be central to the
pursuit of goals. Therefore, regions such as DLPFC should func-
tion as hubs when individuals are pursuing goals. In addition, we
expect the regions posited to be nodes in the model to function
as a module within the larger suite of brain regions active dur-
ing goal pursuit. Finally, in combination with tasks that isolate
specific aspects of the model (e.g., selection and implementation
of tactics), graph theory can be used to test the importance of
a particular node (e.g., dACC) to the isolated model aspect. In
summary, graph theory, among other methods assessing networks
(e.g., Astolfi et al., 2007; Popov et al., 2013), will likely be of great
utility in testing and refining the proposed model.
MODEL IMPLICATIONS
The proposed model has a number of implications for future
research. For example, the type of task manipulation used in a
study (i.e., approach vs. avoidance) should be carefully consid-
ered, because this information should guide hypotheses about
which hemisphere is primarily involved. If a task manipulation
could be both approach- and avoidance-related (e.g., across partic-
ipants), the power of the experiment may be diluted, because some
participants primarily engage left SLPFC, whereas others engage
right. Another implication is that when conducting research aimed
at understanding goal pursuit or control processes in the brain,
researchers should be aware of the motivational level(s) (e.g.,
system vs. tactical) manipulated by their task and examine spe-
cific areas of SLPFC (e.g., anterior DLPFC vs. pre-motor cortex)
accordingly. If a task manipulation engages different levels at dif-
ferent times, and this is not accounted for in the analysis strategy,
power may also be reduced, because SLPFC regions will not be
consistently activated during the manipulation. Alternatively, if a
task manipulation simultaneously engages multiple levels, speci-
ficity regarding regions of SLPFC involved may be lost. Another
consideration implicated by the present model is the time frame
in which goal manipulations operate (e.g., relative to a current or
future state), which should be examined to determine whether
value information is likely to be represented in OFC and/or
MPFC/PCC.
The present model encourages the use of neuroscience data to
drive psychological research on goal-pursuit processes. For exam-
ple, novel hypotheses can be generated based on what is known
about the brain regions involved in implementing those processes.
Additionally, the present model is more spatially specific than pre-
vious models and provides an initial structure for the interactions
among regions. This can be used, for example, to guide the place-
ment of sources in EEG and MEG source localization research.
This allows both for disentangling activity related to multiple,
simultaneously occurring goal-pursuit processes associated with
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different brain areas in the model and for examination of the inter-
actions among regions with great temporal specificity (see Silton
et al., 2010, 2011, for examples of the utility of this technique).
Finally, the present model can improve the utility of neuroscience
research on goal-pursuit and control processes by providing a
framework, incorporating a rich psychological conceptualization
of approach/avoidance motivation, in which to place this research.
Reflected in the present model is an attempt to draw on
nuanced psychological conceptualizations of approach/avoidance
motivation (e.g., Elliot, 2006; Scholer and Higgins, 2008) to
provide a more specific model (in terms of both brain regions and
psychological processes involved) of how motivation is instanti-
ated in brain networks. This model benefits from being informed
by several often disconnected literatures, including psychological
and neuroscience research on the structure of approach/avoidance
approach/avoidance goal pursuit.
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